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Land Use Law Update: Reed v. Town of Gilbert Redux
By Sarah J. Adams-Schoen
The Winter 2015 Land
Use Law Update asked
whether the Supreme Court’s
decision in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert1 would require municipalities throughout the
country to rewrite their sign
codes.2 The short answer is
“yes.”
At a minimum, following
the Supreme Court’s decision
that the Town of Gilbert’s
temporary directional sign regulations violated petitioners Good News Community Church’s and Pastor
Clyde Reed’s First Amendment rights, municipalities
will want to act quickly to amend their sign codes if
they regulate different categories of signs differently. A
code that places fewer restrictions on political or ideological signs than on directional signs likely will not
withstand judicial review. Whether codes that differentiate between commercial and noncommercial signs
will withstand review is an open question, but application of the Court’s content neutrality analysis would
appear to require strict scrutiny of even commercialnoncommercial distinctions—and if the governmental
justifications for the distinction are aesthetics and traffic safety, which they so often are, this distinction also
likely will not withstand judicial review.

Introduction
To briefly summarize, the facts are as follows. The
Town of Gilbert had a sign code that restricted the
size, number, duration, and location of many types of
signs, including temporary directional signs. The code
generally required anyone who wished to post a sign to
obtain a permit, with numerous exceptions for specific
types of signs including “ideological signs,” “political signs,” and “temporary directional signs relating
to a qualifying event.” The code defined ideological
signs as signs “communicating a message or ideas for
noncommercial purposes” that do not fall into one of
several more specific categories; political signs as signs
that “support[] candidates for office or urge[] action on
any other matter” on a national, state, or local ballot;
and, temporary directional signs as “not permanently
attached to the ground, a wall or a building, and not
designed or intended for permanent display,” and
“intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other
passersby” to “any assembly, gathering, activity, or
meeting sponsored, arranged or promoted by a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or
other similar non-profit organization.”3
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Like so many sign codes, the Town of Gilbert’s code
established a hierarchy of restrictions, with the fewest
restrictions on ideological signs and the most restrictions on temporary directional signs. The only restriction on ideological signs was that they “be no greater
than 20 square feet in area and 6 feet in height.” Political signs could be up to 16 square feet (on residential
property) or 32 square feet (on nonresidential property)
in size; may be up to six feet in height; may remain in
place for several days after the election, and were not
generally limited in number. Temporary directional
signs could be “no greater than 6 feet in height and 6
square feet in area”; no more than four such signs “may
be displayed on a single property at any time”; and
such signs could be displayed only “12 hours before,
during, and 1 hour after” the event. They could not be
displayed in “the public right-of-way” or on “fences,
boulders, planters, other signs, vehicles, utility facilities,
or any structure.”4
The Church placed signs in the surrounding area
announcing the time and location of services. Treating
these signs as temporary directional signs, the Town
issued code enforcement notices to the Church. The
Church then sued the Town, claiming that the sign code
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on its face and as applied to the Church.
The district court denied the Church’s motion for a
preliminary injunction and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
this ruling5; the district court then granted summary
judgment for the Town,6 which the Ninth Circuit also
affirmed.7
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Town of
Gilbert’s sign ordinance was content neutral because
the town did not adopt the code because it disagreed
with the message conveyed and its interests in regulating the signs were unrelated to their content.8 In its first
opinion in the Reed matter, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
despite recognizing that an enforcement officer would
have to read the sign to determine what provisions of
the sign code applied. The court explained that this
“kind of cursory examination” for the purposes of determining function “was not akin to an officer synthesizing the expressive content of the sign.”9 On a later
appeal of the district court’s summary judgment for the
petitioners, the court reasoned that the distinctions in
the Town’s code between temporary directional signs,
ideological signs and political signs “are based on objective factors relevant to Gilbert’s creation of the specific
exemption from the permit requirement and do not
otherwise consider the substance of the sign.”10
39

The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and
the Court granted certiorari11—presumably to resolve a
circuit split regarding whether temporary sign regulations that differentiate between sign types based on the
function of the sign are content-based and therefore
subject to strict scrutiny review.12 The National League
of Cities, United States Conference of Mayors, National
Association of Counties, International City/County
Management Association, International Municipal
Lawyers Association, American Planning Association,
and Scenic America13 filed a brief in support of the
Town, warning “that adoption of the strict scrutiny test
has the potential to invalidate nearly all sign codes in
the country, and would thereby imperil the important
traffic safety and aesthetic purposes underlying local
government sign regulation.”14 The United States,
numerous religious and civil liberties organizations,
and nine states filed amicus briefs in support of the
petitioners.15
On June 18, 2015, nine justices agreed with the petitioners that the Town’s sign code was content-based
on its face, that strict scrutiny therefore applied, and
that the code did not pass constitutional muster.16 But,
the justices took such varying routes to this conclusion
that attorneys may find it difficult to determine which
categorical sign regulations are content based, and
therefore likely unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny
analysis.

The Thomas Majority: “A Very Wooden
Distinction”
Six justices joined Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, which took a literal (some say “wooden”17) approach to the question of content neutrality. Essentially,
the Thomas majority opinion stands for the principle
that, if distinctions in a sign code require reading the
sign to determine if the distinction applies, the code is
content based, any content neutral justifications for the
distinctions are irrelevant to the determination of content neutrality and strict scrutiny applies. Moreover, a
code justified by aesthetics and traffic safety will not
survive strict scrutiny if it places more lenient restrictions on political or ideological signs than it places on
temporary directional signs—because no difference exists between these categories of signs in terms of their
impact on aesthetics and traffic safety.
In so holding, the Court rejected several theories
the Ninth Circuit—as well as various amici including the United States—had relied upon to support the
conclusion that the code was content neutral. First, the
Court explained that the Ninth Circuit’s and amici’s
reliance on Ward18 was misplaced because the question
of whether a regulation has a neutral justification is
irrelevant when the regulation is content based on its
face.19 The Court characterized the question of whether
a regulation “draws distinctions based on the message
40

a speaker conveys”20 as “the crucial first step in the
content-neutrality analysis.”21 Only if the answer at the
first step is “no” does the analysis move to the second
step, which asks whether a facially content-neutral law
is still content based as a result of its content-based
justification or adoption by the government “because
of disagreement with the message.”22 Thus, the Court
resoundingly rejected the notion that “an innocuous
justification” can transform a facially content-based sign
code into one that is content neutral.23
Second, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that the content neutrality analysis “should be
applied flexibly with the goal of protecting viewpoints
and ideas from government censorship or favoritism.”24
This reasoning, the Court explained, erroneously
equates with speech regulation generally a particularly
egregious subset of speech regulation—that is, regulation of speech based on “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”25 In
doing so, the Court admonished the Ninth Circuit’s
failure to recognize the well-established application of
the First Amendment to speech regulation that targets a
specific subject matter—such as political speech generally—as opposed to a specific perspective.26
Rejecting classification of codes that distinguish
based on function alone as content neutral, the Court
explained that “[s]ome facial distinctions based on a
message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose,” but
“[b]oth are distinctions drawn based on the message
a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict
scrutiny.”27 Citing Ward, the Court explained that there
are two categories of laws that are content based—those
that are content based on their face including those
that regulate speech by its function or purpose, and
those that cannot be “‘justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech’ or that were adopted
by the government ‘because of disagreement with
the message [the speech] conveys.’”28 Content-based
regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny, and,
where the regulation is content-based on its face, the
government’s justifications or purposes for enacting the
regulation are irrelevant to the determination of whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.
Finally, the Court rejected on factual and legal
grounds the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the sign
code’s distinctions as “turning on the content-neutral
elements of who is speaking through the sign and
whether and when an event is occurring.”29 As a factual
matter, the Court observed that the Town of Gilbert’s
distinctions were not speaker based, but rather categorized by message type—political, ideological or directional—and the applicable category depended on the
content of the message, not the identity of the speaker.
As a legal matter, the Court observed in dicta that “the
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fact that a distinction is speaker based does not…
automatically render the distinction content neutral.”
Rather, “[c]haracterizing a distinction as speaker based
is only the beginning—not the end—of the inquiry.”
Indeed, “‘speech restrictions based on the identity of
the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content.’”30
The Court emphasized three guiding principles
that compelled the result. First, a content-based restriction on speech is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of
the government’s motive and thus “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law
into one that is content neutral.”31 Second, “the First
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints,
but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire
topic” and thus the mere fact that a law is viewpoint
neutral does not insulate it from strict scrutiny.32 Third,
whether a law is speaker-based or event-based makes
no difference for purposes of determining whether it is
content-based.33

The Alito Concurrence: An Attempt to Stave
Off the Sign Code Apocalypse
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Sotomayor and
Kennedy, joined the majority opinion and wrote separately to “add a few words of further explanation.”34 In
an apparent attempt to assuage fears that the Court’s
decision is a harbinger of the sign code apocalypse,
the Alito concurrence explains that certain distinctions between signs are content neutral and provides
a non-exhaustive list of sign regulations that would
not trigger strict scrutiny, including: (1) regulations
that distinguish between free-standing versus attached
signs, (2) regulations of electronic signs with content
that changes, and (3) regulations of the placement of
signs on public versus private property or on- versus
off-premises signs.
But, puzzlingly, the list of content-neutral examples
also includes signs advertising a one-time event. As the
Kagan concurrence discussed below points out, this example is in conflict with the majority opinion—an opinion that the Alito concurrence joined with respect to the
result and reasoning. Under the majority’s reasoning,
regulations that target one-time event signs are content
based. Indeed, how would one know that a particular
sign was covered by the regulation without reading the
sign—and this simple, literal test is the majority test for
content-based.
Given that the Alito concurrence is inconsistent
with the majority reasoning and does not bind the lower courts, its examples of content neutral regulations
may provide cold comfort to municipal officials, attorneys and planners. At the very least, given the tensions
between the majority opinion and Alito concurrence,
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it would seem that, to the extent municipalities intend
to rely on the concurrence’s list of examples of contentneutral sign categories, they should do so cautiously.

The Kagan Concurrence: Bad Facts Make Bad
Law
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan rejected the
notion that a content-based regulation must necessarily trigger strict scrutiny, and concurred only in the
judgment. The Kagan concurrence agrees that the Town
of Gilbert regulation was invalid, but warns that the
majority approach will lead to either a watering down
of strict scrutiny review or courts invalidating many
democratically enacted laws. Echoing the warnings of
amici the American Planning Association, the Kagan
concurrence recognizes that as a result of the Court’s
decision many municipalities will have to repeal many
sign regulations.
In contrast to the literal approach adopted by
the majority and endorsed by the Alito concurrence,
the Kagan concurrence takes a functional approach,
observing that the purpose underlying First Amendment protection simply is not implicated by many
categorical sign codes. Rather, the Kagan concurrence
argues that regulation of signs by function, even when
ascertaining a sign’s function requires reading the
sign, does not threaten the uninhibited marketplace of
ideas. Under the majority’s simple, literal test, warns
Kagan, the Court will “find itself a veritable Supreme
Board of Sign Review.”35 The Kagan concurrence also
criticizes that majority for ignoring the last fifty years
of sign code jurisprudence, and, indeed, the only sign
code case cited by the majority opinion is City of Ladue
v. Gilleo.36
But, bad facts can certainly make bad law, and according to the Kagan concurrence the Town of Gilbert
sign ordinance “does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test.”37 Like many
municipal codes, the Town’s sign code banned outdoor
signs without a permit and created exceptions for
specific sign types. However, the range of those exceptions was, as conceded by the Town’s counsel at oral
argument, “silly.”38 Town of Gilbert’s code created 23
exemptions to the outdoor sign ban for specific types of
signs and placed varying restrictions on the signage depending on which exemption it fell into. For example,
the law exempted “temporal directional signs relating
to a qualifying event,” but placed more severe restrictions on these signs than “ideological signs” or “political signs.” Temporary directional signs were required
to be “no larger than six square feet. They may be
placed on private property or on a public right-of-way,
but no more than four signs may be placed on a single
property at any time. And, they may be displayed no
more than 12 hours before the ‘qualifying event’ and no
more than 1 hour afterward.”
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The Breyer Concurrence: A Regulatory
Apocalypse All Round
In addition to joining the Kagan concurrence,
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence in which he warned
not only of the invalidating effect of the Court’s approach on municipal sign ordinances, but also on a
host of other regulations that require reading to determine the applicability or enforcement of the regulation.
According to Justice Breyer, the Court’s all-or-nothing
approach to content neutrality casts a net that will encompass a wide range of regulations including regulations of airplane warnings, drug warnings, securities
regulations, energy conservation labeling, and—citing
a New York example—signs at petting zoos.39

Conclusion
The key holding in Reed in terms of impact on
municipal authority to regulate signs is the holding
that categorical sign ordinances are content-based. It
follows from Reed that sign ordinances that regulate
signs based on their function—such as directional
signs, event signs, and advertisements—like those
on the books of many New York municipalities, are
content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
The case leaves open the question of whether speakerbased regulations—i.e., ordinances that distinguish
between who is giving the message (e.g., signs for gas
stations)—are subject to strict scrutiny. The case also
leaves open how sign ordinance cases not cited in Reed
will be applied in the future. Did the Court implicitly
abrogate them, or, will lower courts attempt to synthesize Reed and the pre-Reed sign ordinance jurisprudence? Will much of Reed be treated as dicta such that
the line of sign cases not cited remains good law with
Reed being narrowly applied to codes that impose a
laundry list of different requirements to different types
of signs, as Town of Gilbert’s code did.
The sweeping invalidation of legitimate municipal exercises of the police power that would follow
from broad application of Reed suggests that lower
courts are more likely to apply Reed narrowly, relegating to dicta those portions of the opinion that cannot
be synthesized with prior sign ordinance cases that
took a more functionalist approach. For example, two
weeks after Reed was decided the Central District of
California ruled in California Outdoor Equity Partners v.
City of Corona that “Reed does not concern commercial
speech, let alone bans on off-site billboards,” observing
that “[t]he fact that Reed has no bearing on this case is
abundantly clear from the fact that Reed does not even
cite Central Hudson, let alone apply it.”40 Similarly, in
Citizens for Free Speech v. County of Alameda, the Northern District of California distinguished Reed, holding that a sign ordinance that applied to commercial
speech only was content-neutral despite the fact that
the determination of whether a sign is commercial
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requires reading the sign. Citing the court’s duty to
interpret zoning ordinances as constitutionally valid if
fairly possible, the court held that “Reed has no applicability to the issues before the Court” because Reed was
specifically concerned with a sign code’s application of
different restrictions—including temporal and geographic restrictions—to permitted signs based on their
content” and the plaintiffs in Citizens for Free Speech had
“not identified any distinct temporal or geographic restrictions on different categories of permitted signs [the
code at issue] based on those signs’ content.”41 In a later
decision, the same court also concluded that “[b]ecause
Reed does not abrogate prior case law holding that laws
which distinguish between on-site and off-site commercial speech survive intermediate scrutiny, the Court
holds that its prior analysis continues to control the fate
of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.”42
That said, many municipalities make functional distinctions between sign types that can only be applied by
reference to the content of the signs, and, according to
the two-step test laid out in the majority opinion, such
sign ordinances are subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, the
sign ordinances in two other cases the Court vacated
and remanded following Reed will probably appear
familiar to many municipal attorneys and planners.43
These cases involved a zoning ordinance that governs
the placement and size of signs with various restrictions depending on whether a sign is categorized as
a “temporary sign,” “freestanding sign,” or an “other
than freestanding sign,”44 and a sign ordinance that, in
essence, allows more political lawn signs than nonpolitical lawn signs in residential districts.45 In each of
these cases, the lower court had concluded that the regulation, although content-based on its face, was justified
by subordinating valid governmental interests, and was
therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny.46 But, under
the first step of the Reed analysis, a content-neutral
justification is irrelevant and each of these ordinances is
subject to strict scrutiny.
Moreover, regardless of whether New York courts
ultimately apply Reed narrowly or broadly, uncertainty
regarding the scope of Reed is likely to result in more
claims that sign ordinances—as well as other government regulations that distinguish based on categories
that can be discerned only by reading or listening—are
subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
recently extended the holding of Reed to an ordinance
that prohibited panhandling47 and the Fourth Circuit recently applied Reed to an anti-robocall statute
that carved out exemptions for debt collectors among
others, concluding that the statute failed under Reed’s
first step “because it makes content distinctions on its
face,” and, as a result, strict scrutiny applied whether
or not the government’s justification for the statute was
content-neutral.48
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